NASA Administrator
Remarks to the Space Transportation Association
As those who have attended any speech I've given know, I don't read well in public. Everyone seems to enjoy the interactive sessions that typically follow somewhat more. However, I wanted my thoughts on this topic to be available on the written record, so if my remarks this morning come across as an engineering lecture, then I have succeeded. I hope you all had a strong cup of coffee.
Today's topic is motivated by the inquiries I've had lately, in one forum or another, concerning various aspects of NASA's post-Shuttle spaceflight architecture. None of the questions is new, and all of them were elucidated during our Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). The architecture is essentially as it was coming out of ESAS back in September 2005, and the architectural trades we made then when considering mission requirements, operations concepts, performance, risk, reliability, and cost hold true today.
But more than two years have gone by, and the logic behind the choices we made has receded into the background. People come and go, new questioners lacking subject matter background appear, and the old questions must be answered again if there is to be general accord that NASA managers are allocating public funds in a responsible fashion. And so it seemed to me that the time was right to review, again, why we are developing the post-Shuttle space architecture in the way that we are.
As many of you know, I used to teach space system engineering at George Washington University and the University of Maryland, and am more comfortable discussing engineering design than just about any other topic. But as NASA Administrator, I must first frame the Constellation architecture and design in the context of policy and law that dictate NASA's missions.
Any system architecture must be evaluated first against the tasks which it is supposed to accomplish. Only afterwards can we consider whether it accomplishes them efficiently, or presents other advantages which distinguish it from competing choices. So to start, we need to review the requirements expressed in Presidential policy and, subsequently, Congressional direction, that were conveyed to NASA in 2004 and 2005.
The principal documents pertinent to our architecture are President Bush's January 14th, 2004 speech outlining the Vision for Space Exploration, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. Both documents are a direct result of the policy debate that followed in the wake of the Columbia tragedy five years ago, and the observation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), "The U.S. civilian space effort has moved forward for more than thirty years without a guiding vision."
Several items of specific direction are captured in the President's speech: "Our first goal is to complete the International Space Station by 2010. We will finish what we have started, we will meet our obligations to our 15 international partners on this project."
"Research on board the station and here on Earth will help us better understand and overcome the obstacles that limit exploration. Through these efforts we will develop the skills and techniques necessary to sustain further space exploration."
"Our second goal is to develop and test a new spacecraft, the Crew Exploration Vehicle, ... and to conduct the first manned mission no later than 2014. The Crew Exploration Vehicle will be capable of ferrying astronauts and scientists to the Space Station after the shuttle is retired. But the main purpose of this spacecraft will be to carry astronauts beyond our orbit to other worlds."
"Our third goal is to return to the moon by 2020..."
"With the experience and knowledge gained on the moon, we will then be ready to take the next steps of space exploration: human missions to Mars and to worlds beyond."
After extensive debate, the Congress offered strong bipartisan approval of these goals, while adding considerable specificity. From the 2005 Authorization Act for NASA,
"The Administrator shall establish a program to develop a sustained human presence on the Moon, including a robust precursor program, to promote exploration, science, commerce, and United States preeminence in space, and as a stepping-stone to future exploration of Mars and other destinations."
"The Administrator shall manage human space flight programs to strive to achieve the following milestones,
(A) Returning Americans to the Moon no later than 2020.
(B) Launching the Crew Exploration Vehicle as close to 2010 as possible.
(C) Increasing knowledge of the impacts of long duration stays in space on the human body using the most appropriate facilities available, including the ISS.
(D) Enabling humans to land on and return from Mars and other destinations on a timetable that is technically and fiscally possible."
The bill establishes specific requirements for the International Space Station, noting that it must "have an ability to support a crew size of at least six persons", codifying a long-promised design feature in law. It also details statutory requirements for Shuttle transition, including maximizing the use of Shuttle assets and infrastructure:
"The Administrator shall, to the fullest extent possible consistent with a successful development program, use the personnel, capabilities, assets, and infrastructure of the Space Shuttle program in developing the Crew Exploration Vehicle, Crew Launch Vehicle, and a heavy-lift launch vehicle."
Collectively, these requirements outline the broad policy framework for the post-Shuttle U.S. human spaceflight architecture: We will manage the U.S. space program so as to complete the International Space Station by 2010, utilizing the Space Shuttle for that purpose, after which it will be retired. After completion, the ISS will be used to "better understand and overcome the obstacles that limit exploration". The Shuttle will be replaced as soon as possible, but not later than 2014, by a Crew Exploration Vehicle designed to take humans to the Moon and beyond, but which must also be capable of servicing the ISS and its crew of six. The architecture must support human lunar return not later than 2020 and, after that, development of a sustained human lunar presence, both for its intrinsic benefits and as a "stepping stone" to Mars and beyond. Finally, the new architecture must take advantage of existing Space Shuttle program assets "to the fullest extent possible".
Not that anyone asked, but I consider this to be the best civil space policy to be enunciated by a president, and the best Authorization Act to be approved by the Congress, since the 1960s. But no policy is perfect, and none will please everyone. In particular, many in the exploration community, as well as many of those who pursue space science, were disappointed by the reaffirmation of our nation's commitment to the ISS.
But a plain reading of policy and law requires us to understand that, throughout four presidential administrations and twenty-plus Congressional votes authorizing tens of billions of dollars for its development, the ISS has remained an established feature of U.S. space policy. Its support and sustenance cannot be left to chance; the CEV must and will be capable of fulfilling this requirement, and the exploration architecture must and will take that into account. This is nothing more than common sense. The U.S. government will not abandon its commitment to the development and utilization of low Earth orbit (LEO).
There continue to be many questions about NASA's long-term commitment to ISS, so let me clarify. The Bush Administration has made no decision on the end date for ISS operations. We are, of course, concerned that Station operating costs after 2016 will detract from our next major milestone, returning to the Moon by 2020. But while the budget does not presently allocate funds for operating ISS beyond 2016, we are taking no action to preclude it. Decisions regarding U.S. participation in ISS operations after 2016 can only be made by a future Administration and a future Congress. I am sure these will be based on discussions with our international partners, progress toward our Exploration goals, utility of this national laboratory, and the affordability of projected ISS operations. Again, we plan to keep our commitments to our partners, utilizing ISS if it makes sense.
Now, returning to our space architecture, note the order of primacy in requirements. We are not primarily building a system to replace the Shuttle for access to LEO, and upgrading it later for lunar return. Instead, we are directed to build a system to "carry astronauts beyond our orbit to other worlds", but which can be put to the service of the ISS if needed. In brief, we are designing for the Moon and beyond.
That too is only common sense. Once before, an earlier generation of U.S. policymakers approved a spaceflight architecture intended to optimize access to LEO. It was expected - or maybe "hoped" is the better word - that, with this capability in hand, the tools to resume deep space exploration would follow. It didn't happen, and with the funding which has been allocated to the U.S. civil space program since the late 1960s, it cannot happen. Even though from an engineering perspective it would be highly desirable to have transportation systems separately optimized for LEO and deep space, NASA's budget will not support it. We get one system; it must be capable of serving in multiple roles, and it must be designed for the more difficult of those roles from the outset.
There are other common-sense requirements which have not been written down.
The most obvious of these, to me, is that the new system will and should be in use for many decades. Aerospace systems are expensive and difficult to develop; when such developments are judged successful, they tend to remain in use far longer than one might at first imagine. Those who doubt this should look around. The DC-3 and the B-52, to name only two landmark aircraft, remain in service today. The Boeing 747 has been around for thirty years, and who doubts that it will be going strong for another thirty? In space, derivatives of Atlas and Delta and Soyuz are flying a half-century and more after their initial development. Ariane and its derivatives have been around for three decades, with no end in sight. Even the Space Shuttle will have been in service for thirty years by the time it retires. Apart from Saturn/Apollo, I am hard put to think of a successful aerospace system which was retired with less than several decades of use, and often more.
The implications of this are profound. We are designing today the systems that our grandchildren will use as building blocks, not just for lunar return, but for missions to Mars, to the near-Earth asteroids, to service great observatories at Sun-Earth L1, and for other purposes we have not yet even considered. We need a system with inherent capability for growth.
Elsewhere, I have written that a careful analysis of what we can do at NASA on constant-dollar budgets leads me to believe that we can realistically be on Mars by the mid-2030's. It is not credible to believe that we will return to the Moon and then start with a "clean sheet of paper" to design a system for Mars. That's just not fiscally, technically or politically realistic. We'll be on Mars in thirty years, and when we go, we'll be using hardware that we're building today.
So we need to keep Mars in mind as we work, even now. And that means we need to look at both ends of the requirements spectrum. Our new system needs to be designed for the Moon, but allow U.S. government access to LEO. Yet, in designing for the Moon, we need also to provide the maximum possible "leave behind" for Mars. If we don't, then a generation from now there will be a group in this room, listening to the Administrator of that time ask, about those of us here today, "what were they thinking?"
Now, in mentioning "Mars" I must state for the record that I do realize that the $550 billion Consolidated Appropriations Act signed into law last month stipulated that no funds appropriated in 2008 "shall be used for any research, development, or demonstration activities related exclusively to the human exploration of Mars." While I personally consider this to be shortsighted, and while NASA was in any case spending only a few million dollars on long-term research and study efforts, we will of course follow this legislative direction. And while this provision does not affect work on Ares V, it does call into question the fundamental rationale for our use of Space Station in long-duration human spaceflight research. I hope that this funding restriction can be abandoned in future years.
Further application of common sense also requires us to acknowledge that now is the time, this is the juncture, and we are the people to make provisions for the contributions of the commercial space sector to our nation's overall space enterprise. The development and exploitation of space has, so far, been accomplished in a fashion that can be described as "all government, all the time". That's not the way the American frontier was developed, it's not the way this nation developed aviation, it's not the way the rest of our economy works, and it ought not to be good enough for space, either. So, proactively and as a matter of deliberate policy, we need to make provisions for the first step on the stairway to space to be occupied by commercial entrepreneurs - whether they reside in big companies or small ones.
The policy decision that the CEV will be designed for the Moon, while not precluding its ability to provide access to LEO, strongly reinforces this common sense objective. If designed for the Moon, the use of the CEV in LEO will inevitably be more expensive than a system designed for the much easier requirement of LEO access and no more. This lesser requirement is one that, in my judgment, can be met today by a bold commercial developer, operating without the close oversight of the U.S. government, with the goal of offering transportation for cargo and crew to LEO on a fee-for-service basis.
This is a policy goal - enabling the development of commercial space transportation to LEO - that can be met if we in government are willing to create a protected niche for it. To provide that niche, we must set the requirements for the next-generation government spaceflight system at the lunar-transportation level, well above the LEO threshold.
Now again, common sense dictates that we cannot hold the ISS hostage to fortune; we cannot gamble the fate of a multi-tens-of-billions-of-dollar facility on the success of a commercial operation, so the CEV must be able to operate efficiently in LEO if necessary. But we can create a clear financial incentive for commercial success, based on the financial disincentive of using government transportation to LEO at what will be an inherently higher price.
To this end, as I have noted many times, we must be willing to defer the use of government systems in favor of commercial services, as and when they reach maturity. When commercial capability comes on line, we will reduce the level of our own LEO operations with Ares/Orion to that which is minimally necessary to preserve capability, and to qualify the system for lunar flight.
So how is all of this - law, policy, and common sense - realized in the architecture that came out of ESAS?
As I have outlined above, policy and legislation are in some ways quite specific about the requirements for post-Shuttle U.S. spaceflight systems. They are less so where it concerns our lunar goals, beyond the clearly stated requirement to develop the capability to support a sustained human lunar presence, both for its intrinsic value and as a step toward Mars. This leaves considerably more discretion to NASA as the executive agency to set requirements, and with that considerably more responsibility to get it right. Again, I think common sense comes to our rescue.
There is general agreement that our next steps to the Moon, toward a goal of sustained lunar presence, must offer something more than Apollo-class capability; e.g., sorties by two people for three days to the equatorial region. To return after fifty years with nothing more than the capability we once threw away, seems to me to fail whatever test of common sense might be applied to ourselves and our successors.
Accordingly, then, in developing requirements for ESAS we specified that the lunar architecture should be capable of the following:
- Initial lunar sortie missions should be capable of sustaining a crew of four on the lunar surface for a week.
- The architecture will allow missions to any location on the Moon at any time, and will permit return to Earth at any time.
- The architecture will be designed to support the early development of an "outpost" capability at a location yet to be specified, with crew rotations planned for six-month intervals.
One could fill pages debating and justifying these requirements; mercifully, I will not do that. Perhaps another time. In any case, I think it is clear that these goals offer capability significantly beyond Apollo, yet can be achieved with the building blocks - ground facilities as well as space transportation elements - that we have or can reasonably envision, given the budgetary resources we might expect.
It is worth noting that the decision to focus on early development of an outpost - while retaining the capability to conduct a dedicated sortie mission to any point on the lunar surface that might prove to be of interest for scientific or other reasons - supports additional key goals. The most obvious of these is that it provides a more direct "stepping stone" to Mars, where even on the very first mission we will need to live for an extended period on another planetary surface. But further, even a basic human-tended outpost requires a variety of infrastructure that is neither necessary nor possible to include in a sortie mission. Such infrastructure development presents obvious possibilities for commercial and international partner involvement, both of which constitute important policy objectives.
But if the capability we are striving for is greater than that of Apollo, so too is the difficulty. To achieve the basic four-person lunar sortie capability anytime, anywhere, requires a trans-lunar injection (TLI) mass of 70-75 metric tons (mT), including appropriate reserve. Saturn V TLI capability on Apollo 17 was 47 mT without the launch adaptor used to protect the lunar module. Thus, more than Saturn V capability is required if we are to go beyond Apollo. I think we should not be surprised to find that the Apollo engineers got just about as much out of a single launch of the Saturn V as it was possible to do.
If we need more capability to TLI than can be provided by a single launch of a Saturn-class vehicle, we can reduce our objectives, build a bigger rocket, or attain the desired capability by launching more than one rocket. Setting a lesser objective seems inconsistent with our goal of developing the capability for a sustained lunar presence, and, as noted earlier, merely replicating Apollo-era capability is politically untenable.
Building a larger rocket is certainly an attractive option, at least to me, but to reach the capability needed for a single launch brings with it the need for significant modifications to fabrication and launch infrastructure. The Michoud Assembly Facility and the Vertical Assembly Building were designed for the Saturn V, and have some growth margin above that. But they will not accommodate a vehicle that can support our goals for lunar return with a single launch, and the projected NASA budget does not allow the development of extensive new ground infrastructure. Further, and crucially, a single-launch architecture fails to address the requirement for ISS logistics support.
Thus, after detailed consideration of the single-launch option, we settled on a dual-launch Earth-orbit rendezvous (EOR) scheme as the means by which a TLI payload of the necessary size would be assembled.
However, the decision to employ EOR in the lunar transportation architecture implies nothing about how the payload should be split. Indeed, the most obvious split involves launching two identical vehicles with approximately equal payloads, mating them in orbit, and proceeding to the Moon. When EOR was considered for Apollo, it was this method that was to be employed, and it offers several advantages. Non-recurring costs are lower because only one launch vehicle development is required, recurring costs are amortized over a larger number of flights of a single vehicle, and the knowledge of system reliability is enhanced by the more rapid accumulation of flight experience.
However, this architectural approach carries significant liabilities when we consider the broader requirements of the policy framework discussed earlier. As with the single-launch architecture, dual-launch EOR of identical vehicles is vastly overdesigned for ISS logistics. It is one thing to design a lunar transportation system and, if necessary, use it to service ISS while accepting some reduction in cost-effectiveness relative to a system optimized for LEO access. As noted earlier, such a plan backstops the requirement to sustain ISS without offering government competition in what we hope will prove to be a commercial market niche. But it is quite another thing to render government logistics support to ISS so expensive that the Station is immediately judged to be not worth the cost of its support. Dual-launch EOR with vehicles of similar payload class does not meet the requirement to support the ISS in any sort of cost-effective manner.
On the other end of the scale, we must judge any proposed architecture against the requirements for Mars. We aren't going there now, but one day we will, and it will be within the expected operating lifetime of the system we are designing today. We know already that, when we go, we are going to need a Mars ship with a LEO mass equivalent of about a million pounds, give or take a bit. I'm trying for one-significant-digit accuracy here, but think "Space Station", in terms of mass.
I hope we're smart enough that we never again try to place such a large system in orbit by doing it in twenty-ton chunks. I think we all understand that fewer launches of larger payloads requiring less on-orbit integration are to be preferred. Thus, a vehicle in the Saturn V class -some 300,000 lbs in LEO - allows us to envision a Mars mission assembly sequence requiring some four to six launches, depending on the packaging efficiency we can attain.
This is something we did once and can do again over the course of a few months, rather than many years, with the two heavy-lift pads available at KSC Complex 39. But if we split the EOR lunar architecture into two equal but smaller vehicles, we will need ten or more launches to obtain the same Mars-bound payload in LEO, and that is without assuming any loss of packaging efficiency for the launch of smaller payloads. When we consider that maybe half the Mars mission mass in LEO is liquid hydrogen, and if we understand that the control of hydrogen boiloff in space is one of the key limiting technologies for deep space exploration, the need to conduct fewer rather than more launches to LEO for early Mars missions becomes glaringly apparent.
So if we want a lunar transportation architecture that looks back to the ISS LEO logistics requirement, and forward to the first Mars missions, it becomes apparent that the best approach is a dual-launch EOR mission, but with the total payload split unequally. The smaller launch vehicle puts a crew in LEO every time it flies, whether they are going to the ISS or to the Moon. The larger launch vehicle puts the lunar (or, later, Mars) cargo in orbit. After rendezvous and docking, they are off to their final destination.
Once the rationale for this particular dual-launch EOR scenario is understood, the next question is, logically, "why don't we use the existing EELV fleet for the smaller launch?" I'm sure you will understand when I tell you that I get this question all the time. And frankly, it's a logical question. I started with that premise myself, some years back. To cut to the chase, it will work - as long as you are willing to define "Orion" as that vehicle which can fit on top of an EELV. Unfortunately, we can't do that.
The adoption of the shuttle-derived approach of Ares I, with a new lox/hydrogen upper stage on a reusable solid rocket booster (RSRB) first stage, has been one of our more controversial decisions. The Ares V heavy-lift design, with its external-tank-derived core stage augmented by two RSRBs and a new Earth departure stage (EDS), has been less controversial, but still not without its detractors. So let me go into a bit of detail concerning our rationale for the Shuttle-derived approach.
The principal factors we considered were the desired lift capacity, the comparative reliability, and the development and life-cycle costs of competing approaches. Performance, risk, and cost - I'm sure you are shocked.
The Ares I lift requirement is 20.3 mT for the ISS mission and 23.3 mT for the lunar mission. EELV lift capacity for both the Delta IV and Atlas V are insufficient, so a new RL-10 powered upper stage would be required, similar to the J-2X based upper stage for Ares I. We considered using additional strap-on solid rocket boosters to increase EELV performance, but such clustering lowers overall reliability.
It is also important to consider the growth path to heavy lift capability which results from the choice of a particular launch vehicle family. Again, we are designing an architecture, not a point solution for access to LEO. To grow significantly beyond today's EELV family for lunar missions requires essentially a "clean sheet of paper" design, whereas the Ares V design makes extensive use of existing elements, or straightforward modifications of existing elements, which are also common to Ares I.
Next up for consideration are mission reliability and crew risk. EELVs were not originally designed to carry astronauts, and various human-rating improvements are required to do so. Significant upgrades to the Atlas V core stage are necessary, and abort from the Delta IV exceeds allowable g-loads. In the end, the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) derived during ESAS indicated that the Shuttle-derived Ares I was almost twice as safe as that of a human-rated EELV.
Finally, we considered both development and full life cycle costs. I cannot go into the details of this analysis in a speech, and in any case much of it involves proprietary data. We have shared the complete analysis with the DoD, various White House staff offices, CBO, GAO, and our Congressional oversight committees. Our analysis showed that for the combined crew and heavy-lift launch vehicles, the development cost of an EELV-derived architecture is almost 25% higher than that of the Shuttle-derived approach. The recurring cost of the heavy-lift Ares V is substantially less than competing approaches, and the recurring cost of an EELV upgraded to meet CEV requirements is, at best, comparable to that for Ares I. All independent cost analyses have been in agreement with these conclusions.
So, while we might wish that "off the shelf" EELVs could be easily and cheaply modified to meet NASA's human spaceflight requirements, the data says otherwise. Careful analysis showed EELV-derived solutions meeting our performance requirements to be less safe, less reliable, and more costly than the Shuttle-derived Ares I and Ares V.
Now is a good time to recall that all of the trades discussed above assumed the use of a production version of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). But, returning to a point I made earlier, we continued our system analysis following the architecture definition of ESAS, looking for refinements to enhance performance and reduce risk and cost. We decided for Ares I to make an early transition to the 5-segment RSRB, and to eliminate the SSME in favor of the J-2X on the upper stage. Similarly, elimination of the SSME in favor of an upgraded version of the USAF-developed RS-68 engine for the Ares V core stage, with the EDS powered by the J-2X, offered numerous benefits. These changes yielded several billion dollars in life-cycle cost savings over our earlier estimates, and foster the use of a common RS-68 core engine line for DoD, civil, and commercial users.
Praise is tough to come by in Washington, so I was particularly pleased with the comment about our decision on the 5-segment RSRB and J-2X engine in the recent GAO review: "NASA has taken steps toward making sound investment decisions for Ares I." Just for balance, of course, the GAO also provided some other comments. So, for the record, let me acknowledge on behalf of the entire Constellation team that, yes, we do realize that there remain "challenging knowledge gaps", as the GAO so quaintly phrased it, between system concepts today and hardware on the pad tomorrow. Really. We do.
It's time now for a little perspective. We are developing a new system to bring new capabilities to the U.S. space program, capabilities lost to us since the early 1970s. It isn't going to be easy. Let me pause for a moment and repeat that. It isn't going to be easy. Did any of you here today think it was going to be easy? May I see a show of hands? How many of you thought we were going to re-create a capability for the United States to go to the Moon, and do it without any development problems? Anyone?
So, no, we don't yet have all the answers to the engineering questions we will face, and in some cases we don't even know what those questions will be. That is the nature of engineering development. But we are going to continue to follow the data in our decision-making, continue to test our theories, and continue to make changes if necessary.
We have been, I think, extraordinarily open about all of this. Following the practice I enunciated in my first all-hands on my first day as Administrator, in connection with the then-pressing concerns about Shuttle return-to-flight, we are resolved to listen carefully and respectfully to any technical concern or suggestion which is respectfully expressed, and to evaluate on their merits any new ideas brought to us. We are doing that, every day. We will continue to do it.
So, in conclusion, this is the architecture which I think best meets all of the requirements of law, policy, budget, and common sense that constrain us the post-Shuttle era. It certainly does not satisfy everyone, not that I believe that goal to be achievable. To that point, one of the more common criticisms I receive is that it "looks too much like Apollo". I'm still struggling to figure out why, if indeed that is so, it is bad.
My considered assessment of the Constellation Architecture is that while we will encounter a number of engineering design problems as we move forward, we are not facing any showstoppers. Constellation is primarily a systems engineering and integration effort, based on the use of as many flight-proven concepts and hardware as possible, including the capsule design of Orion, the Shuttle RSRBs and External Tank, the Apollo-era J-2X upper stage engine, and the RS-68 core engine. We're capitalizing on the nation's prior investments in space technology wherever possible. I am really quite proud of the progress this multi-disciplinary, geographically dispersed, NASA/industry engineering team has made thus far.
But even so, the development of new systems remains hard work. It is not for the faint of heart, or those who are easily distracted. We can do it if, but only if, we retain our sense of purpose.
In this regard, I'm reminded of two sobering quotes from the CAIB report. First, "the previous attempts to develop a replacement vehicle for the aging Shuttle represent a failure of national leadership." Also, the Board noted that such leadership can only be successful "if it is sustained over the decade; if by the time a decision to develop a new vehicle is made there is a clearer idea of how the new transportation system fits into the nation's overall plans for space; and if the U.S. government is willing at the time a development decision is made to commit the substantial resources required to implement it."
That sort of commitment is what the mantle of leadership in space exploration means, and the engineers working to build Constellation know it every day. Thus, I can only hope to inspire them, and you, with the immortal words of that great engineer, Montgomery Scott, of the USS Enterprise: "I'm givin' 'er all she's got, Captain."
Thank you.
NASA Funding Competition Sparks Rival Plans for Two New Rockets
Alliant Techsystems, Orbital Sciences Vie to Replace Boeing's Delta II Rockets
The Wall Street Journal
01/21/2008
Author: Andy Pasztor
(Copyright (c) 2008, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)
LOS ANGELES -- Federal subsidies to promote commercial space ventures are prompting two midsize aerospace contractors, Alliant Techsystems Inc. and Orbital Sciences Corp., to pursue rival efforts to develop the first new, multipurpose U.S. rockets since the mid-1980s.
In what is shaping up as an intense competition, Alliant, based in Edina. Minn., and Orbital, based in Dulles, Va., are taking sharply different paths to develop the next-generation rockets, envisioned partly to replace the venerable family of Delta II rockets created by Boeing Co. Alliant seems determined to highlight its mature technology and piggyback its investment on National Aeronautics and Space Administration dollars, while Orbital appears more willing to try novel approaches and push ahead without direct government assistance.
Designed to initially take cargo to the International Space Station after the start of the next decade, the proposed launchers also are intended to boost scientific, defense and perhaps commercial satellites of 6,000 pounds or more into high-earth orbit. The two projects are leading a short list of teams vying for $175 million in NASA funding, according to industry officials familiar with the details.
Four teams of finalists are scheduled to be released by NASA early next month, and agency officials so far have declined to comment further. Only one winning proposal is likely to be funded, industry officials said.
The maneuvering comes amid increasing budget and technical hurdles facing NASA's plans to return to the moon. The separate development by NASA and Alliant of the Ares rocket, intended to blast astronauts into lunar missions, has run up against potentially severe vibration problems. At the same time, NASA officials privately are expressing growing concerns about budget constraints and the likelihood that development of a new lunar rocket and manned capsule will stretch beyond the current 2014 timetable.
Alliant later Monday is expected to announce a partnership with Lockheed Martin Corp. and a fledgling space venture, PlanetSpace of Chicago, to develop a new rocket and ground support at a cost of about $500 million. But without swift and direct NASA funding, Alliant "would absolutely want to pause and reassess" those plans, according to Joel Crook, the company's program manager. Technically, PlanetSpace will be the prime contractor. But Alliant is in charge of the rocket's first stage, based on a scaled-down version of the solid rocket boosters used on the space shuttle, and also has developed the engine for the third stage. Intended to blast off from Florida's Cape Canaveral and carry more than six tons of cargo to the Space Station, the proposed launcher also has the backing of a government-industry consortium promoting space projects in that state.
By contrast, Orbital Sciences, which appears to be at an earlier development phase, announced its plans for a new rocket months ago, before the possibility of NASA funding was clear. By keeping fixed costs low and "having a lean production and launch site" operation, according to Orbital Chief Executive David Thompson, the company projects lower launch costs than its rivals. Developments expenses are projected to be around $130 million. "We intend to develop this with our own money," said an Orbital spokesman, but the company won't commit fully to the project without having "a very strong likelihood of launch contracts in hand."
Orbital and Alliant are competing for funding to launch demonstration flights. The ultimate goal is to provide commercial cargo delivery to and from the Space Station. Space Exploration Technologies Corp., a startup based in El Segundo, Calif., previously received NASA funding for its proposed cargo rocket.
The space shuttle is scheduled to be retired in 2010, leaving a gap of at least four years during which the U.S. would have to depend on Russian or European space systems to reach the Space Station. Even if Congress approves all of NASA's funding requests, agency chief Michael Griffin has said that in the current round of space exploration, U.S. astronauts may end up following manned missions the moon launched by China, India, Russia or other nations.
In the face of such worries, NASA continues to push commercial space projects. But the agency appears to be moving away from its initial concept of identifying and subsidizing entrepreneurs or startups as primary engines of technology change. Instead, industry officials said, the focus has shifted to helping finance established aerospace suppliers with the hope of eventually developing breakthrough systems and technologies. Both Orbital and Alliant have to convince NASA they can raise private capital, and that their business plans for the new rockets aren't entirely dependent on federal dollars.
Referring to NASA's unsuccessful bid last year to kick-start a rocket project proposed by startup Rocketplane Kistler Inc., Al Simpson, a veteran Lockheed Martin space official, last week said agency officials "can't afford another failure."
NASA Finds Sensor Problem
Seattle Times
01/21/2008
Author: News Services
(Copyright 2008)
New test results have revealed why fuel sensors on the space shuttle are misbehaving, a problem that baffled engineers and forced the delay of six launches since mid-2005, including Atlantis' liftoff on Dec. 6.
The breakthrough clears the way for Atlantis to try to launch Feb. 7, as NASA officials had hoped.
The problem: a loose electrical plug in circuits that carry the signals from sensors that tell NASA whether the shuttle's fuel tank is about to run dry. Final quality testing started this weekend on a redesigned electrical plug that engineers think will solve the problem.
If major delays accumulate, the international space station, which is still a work in progress, could remain unfinished. Only the shuttle can haul the heavy pieces of the station to orbit, and the shuttle fleet will be retired in mid-2010 - whether the station is done or not - to make way for a safer and more reliable spaceship.
Romney Articulates His Space Policy
Orlando Sentinel
01/21/2008
Author: B. Shaw
(Copyright 2008 by The Orlando Sentinel)
Mitt Romney toured Kennedy Space Center this afternoon and said a few words about how he sees the future of manned space exploration. It includes turning loose some "professional evaluators" on NASA. Here are a couple of excerpts from his comments:
Hello everybody. Very impressive tour today. As you can imagine, we were able to get up into the shuttle itself and look into the cockpit and also got a very close view of the launch site. You recognize the great technology associated with this project, and also the staging area, where the equipment is assembled before it's put in the cargo bay. And clearly, as I've said before, I support the NASA program, the president's vision program, which consists of a manned space mission back to the moon, as well as an ongoing mission to Mars, and with that happy to take any questions you may have.
Q: There's a five-year gap between the last shuttle flight in 2010 and2015 in the president's vision. What about that five-year gap?
A: Well the key thing is to maintain the technology and the personnel that has the proprietary technology to manage a mission such as the new vision program. And so there's gonna have to be an effort to either narrow the gap or to maintain technology or to provide opportunities for the key engineers and personnel so that we don't lose the capacity to carry the program forward, but that's not something which I have evaluated yet on the basis of speaking with leaders here at NASA or with other professional evaluators. And I don't have a figure on that, and that's something I'll look at if I'm lucky enough to get that job."
Q: The space program is gong to need approx a billion to $2 bill a year to remain viable. Are you prepared to commit to that right now?
A: I'm prepared to study it very thoroughly, and I'm not prepared to make commitments without having studied things, having grown up in a sector where you study things thoroughly before you make a decision. That's something I would study with the benefit of not only NASA experts but also people from the outside who would take a good look and see what our options are. But I do want to maintain our space program, I do want to have a successful vision program, I do want to maintain our technology. And I realize technology is resident in the minds of experts, and we can't afford to lose people who have proprietary technology if we're going to do a successful space program.
The Political Space Race is Officially On
Orlando Sentinel
01/21/2008
Author: Robert Block
(Copyright 2008 by The Orlando Sentinel)
Now that the hunt for votes has moved to the Sunshine State, Republican candidates are feeling the gravitational pull of space policy as an electoral issue.
Mitt Romney, fresh from his victory in the Nevada primary, needs to outshine former N.Y. mayor Rudy Giuliani in Florida, where Giuliani is has been spending all his time (and money) lately. The feeling among space buffs is that if Mitt wants to be competitive in capturing support along Florida's vital I-4 corridor, he has to match or beat Giuliani's pledge to back NASA's quest for the moon and Mars. Romney seems more than ready to accept the challenge.
On Friday, as Giuliani was promising a bright future for NASA to local officials and aerospace industry representatives in Cape Canaveral, Romney agreed to meet the same group, ostensibly to offer his support for space travel. But Romney is going to go one step further than America's mayor: after his private tour of Kennedy Space Center -- and before meeting space leaders -- Romney will hold a press conference at 5pm EST in the parking lot of KSC's Visitor Complex with the rockets of past glories forming a backdrop behind him. (Giuliani also toured the space center but rather than grandstanding he went straight to the space round table meeting.)
Romney had been trying to get NASA to allow the press to follow him on his tour of KSC, but NASA was having none of it. The agency took a beating during the last election after it posted on its website pictures of presidential candidate John Kerry wearing a blue flight suit. The trouble was that the snapshots from Kerry's visit seemed to some like an endorsement.
So this time around, candidates are welcome to visit KSC as long as they leave journalists on the bus.
But Mitt, keen for the photo opportunity that Giuliani missed, decided to end his tour in the visitor complex outside the gates of the space center.
This electoral one-upmanship is exactly the kind of competitive behavior that space fans have been praying for.
Local lobbyists and the Economic Development Commission of Florida's Space Coast who organized the space round tables have been trying for months to turn space policy into a campaign issue and get the candidates to articulate their space policy, and then compete with each other over the issue. The EDC sent out invitations for round tables to all the candidates. So far only Arizona Senator John McCain, citing scheduling problems, has outright turned them down. Other candidates, like Mike Huckabee, are still considering it. (The Democrats are not going to campaign in Florida because it changed its primary date.)
Giuliani was the first candidate to accept the invitation.
"We were extremely fortunate it was Giuliani who accepted to speak to us first," said one space lobbyist. "He bet the farm on Florida... and because he is so desperate he set the bar so high that everyone has to be even more aggressive or be willing to tell people something that they don't want to hear and be compared to him."
The problem is that while candidates are indeed starting to speak about space policy in ways that they have not for decades, none have been willing to talk in specifics about funding levels, which is ultimately what it is all about.
New NASA Aeronautics Research Chief Named
Published: Jan. 21, 2008 at 8:44 AM
United Press International
WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 (UPI) -- The U.S. space agency has named Jaiwon Shin as its associate administrator for aeronautics research.
Shin will be responsible for managing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's aeronautics research portfolio, including research in the fundamental aeronautics of flight, aviation safety and the nation's airspace system. Prior to the appointment, Shin served as NASA's deputy associate administrator for aeronautics.
"Jaiwon brings expert knowledge of aeronautics and technology to a critical position at NASA," said NASA Administrator Michael Griffin said. "He's helped develop the aeronautics research road map for the 21st century. His leadership of the directorate will assure our continued recognition as the world's premiere aeronautics research organization."
Shin previously was chief of the aeronautics projects office at NASA's Glenn Research Center in Cleveland. From 1998-2002, he served as chief of NASA's Aviation Safety Program Office as well being deputy program manager for NASA's Aviation Safety Program and Airspace Systems Program.
Shin received his doctorate in mechanical engineering from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. His bachelor's degree is from Yonsei University in South Korea and his master's degree is in mechanical engineering from the California State University-Long Beach.
Israel Launches Advanced Spy Satellite
Associated Press Newswires
01/21/2008
Copyright 2008. The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.
JERUSALEM (AP) - Israel launched an advanced spy satellite Monday that will be able to track events in Iran, the country it considers its top foe, even at night and in cloudy weather, defense officials said.
The TECSAR satellite is of particular importance for Israel because it can be used to keep tabs on Iran's nuclear program, which the U.S. and Israel fear is a cover for pursuing nuclear weapons, they said.
The satellite, developed by Israel Aerospace Industries, operates with a special radar system, allowing it to view much more than existing Ofek satellites that use cameras, the officials said on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the press.
Israel has backed U.S. efforts to get the international community to intensify sanctions against Tehran over its nuclear program. Iran insists its program is for power generation.
The company confirmed the satellite launching in a statement.
"The TECSAR is the first satellite of its kind developed in Israel, and ranks among the world's most advanced space systems," the statement said.
The satellite includes an advanced imaging system based on synthetic aperture radar, or SAR, technology, the statement said.
The development and launching cost tens of millions of dollars, the officials said. Within two weeks it will be possible to view pictures from the device, the officials said.
Israeli and Indian experts cooperated to launch the satellite with an Indian rocket from southeastern India, IAI said.
The satellite weighs some 660 pounds, the Israeli Haaretz newspaper reported, citing unnamed company officials.
Israel currently operates a number of reconnaissance satellites, including Ofek 5 and Ofek 7, as well as several commercial satellites such as the Amos and EROS series, Haaretz said
Richard Branson's Race for Space Tourists
The Daily Telegraph (London)
01/22/2008
Author: Sophie Campbell
Copyright (C) 2008 The Daily Telegraph; Source: World Reporter™
When Trevor Beattie was 11 years old, in Class 2a at Moseley School of Art in Birmingham, he did a project called "The Space Race".
He's still got it: a brown-paper covered masterpiece in blue fountain pen, sprinkled with illustrations, diagrams and yellowed cuttings taken from the Daily Mirror of April 1970, as the Apollo 13 astronauts circled the earth, fighting for their lives.
Tomorrow, Beattie, a 49-year-old advertising guru famous for his campaigns for French Connection and Wonderbra, will be in New York for the unveiling of the commercial sub-orbital spacecraft SpaceShipTwo.
Owned by Richard Branson's Virgin Galactic and nearing completion in California's Mojave Desert, it should take Beattie into space within the next 18 months, at a cost of £102,000.
It might not be EasyJet, but it is a start, says Beattie: "It'll be a lot cheaper in 10 years. I think the unveiling will be a big moment. People will sit up and take notice." Physicist Stephen Hawking is also planning a trip with Galactic after enjoying a gravity-free trip last year.
All over the world during the 1960s, little boys were glued to black-and-white television sets, as Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space and Buzz Aldrin and Neil Armstrong bounced on the Moon.
More than 40 years later, a highly successful and extremely wealthy group - Richard Branson, of Virgin; Jeff Bezos, of Amazon; Elon Musk, of PayPal; and the US hotelier Robert Bigelow - is driving the race to get us into space.
By "us", I mean tourists, rather than professional astronauts. At the moment, there are only two ways to do it: for one - orbital - you have to be insanely rich; for the other - sub-orbital - just very rich.
The only paying astronauts to have gone into space so far - the California-based businessman Dennis Tito being the first and most famous - have done orbital trips with the US company Space Adventures.
These piggyback on the Russian Soyuz rockets that visit the International Space Station (ISS) twice yearly, and happen to have a spare seat, so that a "private space explorer" can go up with two cosmonauts and spend almost a week at the ISS, doing basic experimental and maintenance work.
You float, you fly, you "chase" the ISS, orbiting at more than 17,000mph, and you see 32 sunrises and sunsets every 24 hours. First, however, you have to spend six months training at Star City near Moscow, learn basic Russian and pay £15.3million.
Space travel with Virgin Galactic will be sub-orbital: the spacecraft will do a single, parabolic rocket flight into space and back, with views of Earth and four or five minutes of weightlessness - a trip of around two and a half hours.
It might be dismissed as "space tourism", but it could do for space travel what the Boeing 747 did for aviation.
"The flight of Dennis Tito was the watershed moment," according to Eric Anderson, president of Space Adventures. "Though it was a vast sum of money, it proved there was a market for space tourism. And investors started to put in money."
Anousheh Ansari, an American-Iranian businesswoman whose family funded the $10million (£5million) X-Prize - to be awarded to "the first team to build and fly privately a spacecraft capable of carrying three people to an altitude of 100km (62 miles) twice in a two-week period" - was the first female passenger with Space Adventures, just after her 40th birthday in September 2006.
Once she was weightless, she flew about too enthusiastically and was sick for almost 24 hours. The windows were small and there was no shower. She would go back tomorrow.
Writing a blog from the ISS - the first - she revelled in the smell of space ("like burned almond cookies"), the humbling sight of Earth, the difficulties of washing her long hair and watching the space shuttle Atlantis return home, "first a flash of orange colour, then a steady point of light... toward the final stages it looked like a beautiful comet in slow motion".
She is passionate about the future of space for human development, and believes tourism might be the key. "The costs will drop as the flight numbers increase," she argues, "and demand for flights will be created by the tourism industry."
Cue Richard Branson, who was a teenager when he watched the Apollo landings with his parents in 1969, and is hoping to take them - and his 22-year-old son Sam - on the first flight on SpaceShipTwo when it launches.
In 1999, Virgin executive Will Whitehorn had patented the Virgin Galactic name and was looking for ways to add space to the company's field of operations.
Meanwhile, in America, the Ansari family had started the X-Prize and the state of New Mexico - already linked to space through the Manhattan Project, and the supposed extra-terrestrial visits to Roswell - had decided to build a spaceport on an 18,000-acre tract of ranch land next to White Sands Missile Range (apart from the White House, the only completely closed airspace in the country).
Two years later, Whitehorn was out in the Mojave, where Burt Rutan, the aerospace design expert, and his company Scaled Composites, were building a carbon composite plane.
"In the corner of the factory was a rocket," Whitehorn remembers. "I rang Richard and said, 'He's building a spaceship'."
It was SpaceShipOne, secretly funded by Paul Allen - the co-founder of Microsoft - which rocketed into history on October 4, 2004, winning the X-Prize. However, Allen wasn't interested in pursuing the project commercially, so Rutan needed a backer with vision and deep pockets.
By the time SpaceShipOne made its second, prize-winning flight, it was Virgin Galactic-branded, Branson had the commercial rights to the technology and Trevor Beattie had sent off his cheque.
Later this year, ground will be broken on the New Mexico spaceport, designed by Foster & Associates. Then, by 2009, the flights will start: after three days' training, the tourists will be strapped into SpaceShipTwo.
After take-off, slung beneath the carrier aircraft, WhiteKnightTwo, they will be able to walk around inside as they circle up to 50,000 feet. Then they will be dropped off into a short glide before the rocket fires, shooting them vertically to 68 miles (almost 110?km) above the Earth in 90 seconds.
The wings will flip into a "shuttlecock" position, steering the ship in an arc before it re-enters the atmosphere in a slow, low-friction glide. The experience promises huge windows and "choreographed flying".
Passengers will probably have flightsuits, though they aren't necessary, and possibly "Nasa nappies" - there will be no loo and no food for such a short flight - and seats will lie flat on re-entry, to help bodies absorb the force of 6Gs (compared by astronauts to "an elephant sitting on your chest") as painlessly as possible.
At around 70,000ft (21,336m), the craft will circle slowly down to land.WhiteKnightTwo has twin fuselages, each a replica of the spaceship cabin, so they can be used for training pilots and passengers, and for paying flights for people who don't want to go all the way to space. It will also be able to carry 30-ton loads.
In the first year, more people will go to space than have ever been (although that's only 460). By year three, there should be three aircraft and two spaceships in action. They intend to take these craft to different locations, including the Swedish Spaceport at Kiruna and, possibly, RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland.
It all sounds very sexy, but Virgin Galactic is taking a giant commercial risk. SpaceShipTwo is twice as long as SpaceShipOne and must carry two pilots and six passengers in a comfortable cabin, rather than one pilot in a prototype. Testing will begin on the carrier plane in June and, if that is successful, there will be months of test flights ahead.
Safety is paramount, morally and commercially; a space disaster involving paying passengers would be unthinkable. "Burt Rutan won't hand this thing over until he would fly his children in it," says Stephen Attenborough, commercial director of Galactic. "And Richard is taking Sam on the first flight."
But, as Nasa already knows to its cost, manned space travel is risky. Only last week, California safety inspectors fined Rutan's firm, Scaled Composites, and said in a report that the company had failed to train workers properly for a fuel system test that went wrong, when three died and three were seriously injured.
The explosion at a remote testing facility in the Mojave desert was part of the development of a new rocket motor for SpaceShipTwo.
Despite the risks, Virgin Galactic is not the only firm developing space tourism. While most billionaires with aerospace companies are working on payload vehicles, taking satellites or other equipment into space, some have an eye on manned flight, and Robert Bigelow is even planning human habitats.
What President Kennedy would do if he knew that the space race involves a US company working with Russians and a British company planning to launch from American soil, we will never know.
But it's happening. Certainly, a lot of people - including the super-rich of Russia, China and India, who perhaps did their own school projects on space - will be watching the progress of SpaceShipTwo with interest.
Space-tech Could Make Life Easier for Diabetics
PRESS RELEASE
Date Released: Monday, January 21, 2008
German student Nicole Schmiedel has come up with a design for a trendy-looking wristwatch that contains an innovative ultra-light insulin pump to help people with type 1 diabetes. The watch produces its own electricity thanks to the use of piezo-electric technology originally developed for European satellites.
A prototype of the novel insulin pump wristwatch named COR won one of the three Design and Technology Student Awards at this year's MATERIALICA trade fair in Munich. It was presented for business professionals at this year's European Space Technology Transfer Conference, an initiative of ESA's Technology Transfer Programme Office.
Inside COR a piezo-electric transducer absorbs the energy of even the slightest movement of the person who wears it and converts it into electricity to drive the insulin pump.
The transducer is based on those developed for space programmes where they are used in micro-positioning and vibration damping of optics embedded on satellites, such as those incorporated in the MIDAS instrument onboard ESA's Rosetta comet chaser.
"I got the idea for the insulin pump wristwatch when I watched a film of a little 8-year old girl with diabetes using an insulin pump and saw what she had to go through to get her daily doses of insulin," recalls Nicole Schmiedel, an industrial design student at the Braunschweig University of Arts in Germany.
Many diabetics who need multiple daily insulin injections to control their blood sugar use cumbersome syringes or even bulkier equipment which limits their mobility. Few use insulin pumps or other newer techniques. Schmiedel wanted to design a system to improve the quality of life for diabetics and allow them to lead as normal a life as possible.
Schmiedel's design looks like a modern wristwatch but contains a pump with sufficient insulin for two to three weeks use by a type-1 diabetic. The pump is attached to the user via a thin tube and a needle inserted under the skin to allow the insulin to flow into the body continuously, substituting conventional syringe injections.
"COR looks like a watch and not a medical device," she adds. "When the pump is not in operation the menu switches to watch mode and displays the current time and date. It also includes an alarm clock."
Piezo-electric transducer space technology -- squeezing electricity out of a crystal
Piezo-electric transducer technology is based on a physical phenomenon that has been known for a long time but was only researched and developed into a handy technology for space programmes back in the 1990s. When a small voltage is applied to a crystal such as quartz it causes it to change shape, that is to expand or contract.
Onboard the Rosetta satellite this phenomenon is used in piezo-electric transducers for micro-adjusting the positions of the MIDAS instrument as well as for its vibration damping.
Conversely, pressure resulting in a deformation of the crystal shape provokes a voltage that can be measured. Being proportional with the deformation it can be used to measure the amount of pressure, or deformation. In the same way the deformation of the piezo-electric transducer from vibrations caused by any movement of COR generates a voltage which can be used to drive the insulin pump.
Schmiedel has chosen the piezo-electric transducer "DuraAct" from the German company INVENT to drive her insulin pump.
"We started research into this new area a while back and two years ago we started the industrial production of our piezo-electric transducers named DuraAct. It is used by different companies in different fields. For example an automobile company uses our transducers in systems for noise damping of cars," says Stefan Linke from INVENT GmbH.
"The insulin pump in the COR insulin wristwatch needs around 50-100 milliwatts, which could be provided with just one DuraAct transducer. However, by using four to five transducers located around the wristband, energy generation from movement in any direction is more efficient. It is also safer as the insulin pump will continue to operate even if one transducer fails."
The electricity is stored inside the wristwatch in accumulators ready for use. This secures a stable electricity supply even through periods of low-energy generation such as sleep.
"I was only able to design COR because the piezo-electric transducer technology had already been developed for space programmes and was ready to use," says Schmiedel. "The next step is to find a company to produce COR and market it."
ESA's Technology Transfer Programme Office (TTPO)
The main mission of the ESA TTPO is to facilitate the use of space technology and space systems for non-space applications and to further demonstrate the benefit of the European space programme to European citizens. The TTPO is responsible for defining the overall approach and strategy for the transfer of space technologies including the incubation of start up companies.
For more information, please contact:
Technology Transfer Programme
European Space Agency - ESTEC
Keplerlaan 1, P.O. BOX 299, 2200 AG, Noordwijk
The Netherlands
Office: +31 (0) 71 565 3910
Fax: +31 (0) 71 565 6635
Email: ttp @ esa.int
Boeing's Lean plan for 787 Stumbled Over Supplier Issues
Flight International
01/21/2008
Boeing's dream of a lean 787 production line only performing final assembly, integration and testing began to unravel when airframe sections arrived from suppliers around the world with unfinished work that the airframer's Everett, Washington plant was unequipped to complete.
This became clear on 16 January when the company announced another delay to the 787 programme, pushing first flight back three months to the end of June and first deliveries into early 2009. When it rolled out in July 2007, Dreamliner One was to fly by the end of August that year.
"We underestimated how long it would take to complete someone else's work," says Pat Shanahan, vice-president and general manager of the 787 programme. Announcement of the latest delay, on Shanahan's 90th day on the job, came after Boeing failed to meet its milestones for completing "travelled work" on the first aircraft.
"Everett is a lean facility tailored to last-stage, high-level assembly and test," he says. "We thought we accommodate work from our suppliers. Perhaps if we were set up like an MRO [maintenance, repair and overhaul organisation] we would have made more progress."
The Everett facility was designed to mate major airframe sections that arrived from suppliers fully assembled and stuffed with systems. Instead, Boeing workers have had to remove and replace thousands of temporary fasteners and install missing parts. It is completing this work that is now delaying first flight.
"Travelled work is the long pole," says Shanahan. Fastener and parts shortages are no longer pacing items. "One month ago aircraft number one was over 10,000 fasteners short. Now it is down to hundreds, and parts shortages are at a manageable level."
But until Boeing completes assembly of the fuselage it cannot install the wiring needed to put power on the aircraft, the next major milestone on the way to first flight. "We need to get the travelled work completed. It's the pacing item," he says.
"Of the several thousand part numbers and system components needed to activate the aircraft, we need only 27 more to get power on. By Monday [20 January] we will have all 27 parts," he says. "If the aircraft was available on Monday, with its wiring, tubing and ducting, we would be able to install all those system components."
But the aircraft is not ready. Power-on has been pushed back to the beginning of the second quarter, although Shanahan says Boeing is already running power-up build verification tests in the laboratory in Seattle. After power-on, he says, another 20 system components are needed to get the 787 through taxi tests.
The latest delay is humiliating for Boeing, which in December thought it was turning the corner on completing assembly of the aircraft. "Why is it taking so much time?" asks Shanahan. "It's not a matter of how quickly we can drill holes. It's the process of reconciling partner engineering with our production system that is the pacing item."
The previous plan to fly the 787 by the end of March was based on parametric analysis, not hands-on experience. "We had not done partner work in our facility. Now we have the demonstrated performance of the last two months, more knowledge of the work statement and more of the right skills and resources," he says.
"The focus now is on not travelling the type of work that is disruptive to our production system," he says. Boeing says aircraft two, and those behind it, "will arrive when the sections meet the required condition of assembly". Aircraft two is expected in Everett by the end of January "and will arrive in much better condition" than the first 787, it says.
Boeing expects to complete its assessment of the delay's impact on deliveries by the end of the first quarter, but it no longer expects to deliver 109 aircraft in 2009. "The shortages are not a rate production issue, it's a work sequence problem," Shanahan says. "If there is travelled work it has to be the right kind of work that Boeing can accommodate."
Anticipation Mounts for New 787 Delivery Dates as Airlines Eye Contingencies
Flight International
01/21/2008
Author: Mary Kirby
Airlines and aircraft lessors worldwide are anxiously awaiting word from Boeing on when they can expect to receive delivery of their initial 787s, following the airframer's decision to delay first flight of the twinjet and push back initial deliveries from late 2008 to early 2009.
Receiving delivery information in a timely fashion now is critical, as it will allow carriers to assess and implement further contingency plans to address the latest slip, including aircraft deferrals and short-term leases.
Boeing says it expects to complete an assessment for new delivery schedules by the end of the first quarter. However, the manufacturer has already made clear it does not expect to deliver the planned 109 aircraft in 2009.
Shifting fleet plans in the face of the 787's slip is an all-too-familiar scenario for some carriers. Boeing in October 2007 opted to delay initial 787 deliveries by six months. At that time, about 15 airlines were affected by the shift in delivery of between 30 and 35 787s from 2008 to 2009. Chinese carriers, which were counting on receiving 787s in advance of the summer Olympic Games in Beijing, were forced to implement alternative measures to address the delay. Air China, for example, had planned to return two Boeing 767-300ERs on lease from International Lease Finance (ILFC) in the May/June 2008 timeframe, but requested and received an extension to the lease.
"Even though we had tentatively placed those aircraft [767s] with another airline, we have been able to work with Air China to allow them to keep those aircraft for an additional three to five months to get them through the Olympics," says ILFC president John Plueger. "Other lessors are doing the same."
ILFC's first 787 deliveries are scheduled for 2010 the company is slated to take 10 for the year. When the first delay was announced, ILFC was advised by Boeing that the lessor's schedule would not be impacted. As a matter of prudence, however, ILFC advised customers to take alternative steps for deliveries in the first half of 2010, says Plueger.
In light of the latest delay, however, "we don't know now" when to expect first deliveries, he says. "Those [787s] that are coming in the first half of the year [2010], I would not be surprised if they were impacted," he says, noting that it is possible that the entire batch of 10 could be impacted.
He adds: "I think you have to look at the circumstances for this aircraft. There is so much more subcontractor supplier scheduling that is impacting this programme I actually think it is very truly difficult for Boeing to be able to make a really accurate assessment."
Plueger points out that production and certification of the 787 is coming at a time when the entire aerospace supply "has reached its maximum point of elasticity".
"I think that is somewhat compounding difficulties with delays on the 787," he adds.
Among the first airlines to publicly express their disappointment with the latest delay are SkyTeam members Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines, which had hoped to deploy 787s on new flights to China next year. Continental says this will "make for a tough summer" in 2009, and that the airline is now mulling the use of other aircraft on planned New York Newark-Shanghai service. "As we get information on the extent of the delay, we'll make the appropriate adjustments to enable us to continue to develop our international network," says Continental chairman and chief executive Larry Kellner.
Northwest Airlines, the North American launch customer for the 787, says: "We are very disappointed by Boeing's announcement but we're hopeful that Boeing will address the problems with the 787 production expeditiously and be in a position to provide us with a reliable delivery schedule." Northwest is looking at the possibility of operating proposed Detroit-Shanghai flights with Boeing 747-400s.
Air Canada, meanwhile, says that "based on information provided by Boeing at this time, we continue to expect our first delivery of the 787 in 2010". The Canadian operator has a total 37 787s on order with the manufacturer.
